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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Did the lower Court abuse its discretion in denying

Downtown Athletic Club's "Motion for Continuance" and "Motion to
Compel Discovery" seeking the deposition of Mr. Sidney M. Hormanf
which had already

been completed

earlier , and which was not

sought until after oral argument was had on defendants' "Motion
for Summary Judgment."
2.

Did the lower Court err in granting defendants' "Motion

for Summary Judgment," holding that Downtown Athletic Club failed
to comply with the conditions precedent found in the agreement
upon which Downtown Athletic Club's complaint is based and the
alleged oral agreement is void under the Statute of Frauds.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE CASE
On

September

Downtown

Athletic

9,

1983,

Club,

Plaintiff

Inc.,

and

(hereafter

appellant
"DAC")

herein,

filed

the

complaint against S. M. Horman, S. M. Horman & Sons, and S. M.
Horman

&

Sons Company

(hereafter

"defendants")

seeking

both

specific performance and money damages for an alleged breach of
two

purported

agreements

between

the

parties

pertaining

to

property located in the center of Block 57 in downtown Salt Lake
City.

(R.p. 2-55).

September
December

of

1983,

6, 1983.

Even though the complaint was filed in
inexplicably

service

(R.p. 58, 59).

was

not

made

until

Defendants answered and

counterclaimed against DAC and its principal officer David G.
Yurth for declaratory relief, tortious waste, unlawful detainer,
and slander of title.(R.p. 75-118).
Three days after the service of the Summons and Complaint,
DAC noticed the deposition of Sidney M. Horman.

(R.p. 71). Six

days after service of the summons, DAC served defendants with
lengthy "Requests for Production of Documents."

(R.p. 61-70).

Defendants responded to DAC's requests, filed their own "Requests
for Production of Documents" on January 13, 1984, and noticed the
taking of the deposition of DAC through David G. Yurth, its
president, on December 15, 1983.

(R.pp. 73, 123-134, 135-147).

Defendants produced requested documents to the plaintiff and DAC
produced what it claimed to be all of its corporate records,
consisting of thousands of documents.
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The deposition of David G.

Yurth was taken by defendants on April 2, 1984, (R.p. 607), and
DAC took Mr. Horman's deposition on April 26, 1984.(R.p. 608).
No further discovery was undertaken by DAC.

On July 19f

1984f defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment together
with

supporting

authorities.

affidavits

and

a

memorandum

(R.pp. 369 and 322-368).

of

points

and

At the same time notice

of hearing was served scheduling oral argument on the motion for
August 28f 1984f thus providing DAC nearly six weeks
respond.

in which to

(R.p. 262). On August 22f 1984f rather than respond to

the defendants' motionf and only five days before the scheduled
hearing, DAC's counsel moved to withdraw from the case and for a
sixty-day extension for DAC to respond to defendants' motion.
(R.p. 376, 378).

The District Court granted both motions on

August 28, 1984, the date scheduled for the original hearing.
(R.p. 380).

Sixty days, however, lapsed without any appearance

of counsel for DAC and without any response to the motion for
summary judgment.
On October 26, 1984, defendants served notice pursuant to
U.C.A. S 78-51-36
(R.p. 382).

requiring

On November

the plaintiff to appoint counsel.

2, 1984, defendants renoticed their

Motion for Summary Judgment for hearing on November 16, 1984.
(R.p. 384).
Three days prior to the November 16th hearing, Lorin N. Pace
and William B. Parsons III of the firm of Pace, Klimt, Wunderli &
Parsons formally appeared

as counsel and

filed a Motion for

Continuance and nine notices of deposition.
554-561, 579-586, and 568-569).

(R.pp. 552, 565,

The depositions sought by DAC's
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counsel

included,

among

others,

Mr.

Sidney

Horman,

whose

deposition had already been takenf and Mr. L. R. Gardiner, Jr.,
counsel for the defendants.

(R.pp. 565, 568f and 322-368).

Shortly before the scheduled hearing on November 16, DAC
filed an Extraordinary Request for Review by which it sought a
hearing on its motion for continuance even though that motion was
not timely noticed.
defendants1

At the noticed hearing on

Motion for Summary Judgment, DAC requested

heard on its reward
continuance.
defendants

(R.p. 387).

for extraordinary

to be

review and motion for

Even though neither had been properly noticed,
did

not

object

to

DAC

being

heard

and

DAC's

Extraordinary Request for Review was granted but its Motion for
Continuance

was

denied.

Oral

argument

was

presented

on

defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court took the
motion under advisement, giving DAC twenty days in which to file
a written response to defendants' motion.

(R.pp. 386, 591).

On December 7, 1984, DAC filed a Motion to Compel Discovery
seeking to compel the taking of the deposition of only one of the
nine depositions noticed just prior to the hearing on defendants'
motion.

(R.p. 393).

By this" motion, plaintiff sought only to

take further deposition of Mr. Horman, who had previously been
deposed in the case.
After having obtained still further extensions of time, on
December 10, 1984, DAC finally filed its Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment, accompanied by eight affidavits,
several

of

which

were

unsworn

and

unsigned.

(R.p* 406).

Defendants timely submitted their reply memorandum (R.p. 502) and

-4-

a Motion to Strike the unswornf unsigned and improper affidavits
of David Yurthr Grant Squires, and Maurice Green.

(R.p. 542).

DAC made no response to the motion

it did not

to strike and

correct any of its improper affidavits.
Following

the

Court's Memorandum

Decision

of

January

23,

1985, (R.p. 587), its Order and Summary Judgment was entered on
February
motion

6, 1985.

to

defendants'
affidavits

further
motion

(R.p. 590).
depose
to

Mr.

The Court

Horman

strike

the

(R.p.

two

denied

plaintiff's

595); granted

unsigned

and

the

unsworn

(the Green and Squires affidavits), the affidavit of

Mr. Yurth purporting to verify the unsigned affidavits, and those
portions of the second Yurth affidavit that did not comply with
Rule 56(e) (R.p. 596); and granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants.

(R.p. 597). The District Court held that:

Rule 56 requires that when a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported, as provided in the
rule, which is the case here, the response must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a "genuine"
issue for trial. Rule 56 requires judgment if there is
no "genuine" issue as to "material" facts. The motion
for summary judmentfsic] has been amply supported, as
provided in the rule, and shows that there can be no
genuine issue that plaintiff has failed to comply with
several conditions precedent in the agreements upon
which plaintiff's complaint is based, and that the
alleged oral agreement or modification fails to meet
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The
plaintiff's response has not shown that there is a
genuine issue as to any material fact, and the motion
for summary judgment must therefore be granted. There
is no just reason for delay in entry of this judgment,
and summary
judgment
in favor of defendants on
plaintiff's complaint should be entered at this time.
(R.pp. 596-597).
In denying the motion to compel the additional deposition of Mr.
Horman, the Court noted that:
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w

[t]he deposition of Mr. Horman was taken in this case
by previous counsel for plaintiff on April 26, 1984.
Plaintifff during the entire time that the motion for
summary judgment was pending, made no further effort to
take further deposition of Mr. Horman or to undertake
further discovery until the filing of various notices
of taking depositions three days before the hearing on
the motion for summary judgment on November 16, 1984.
The affidavit filed by plaintiff's counsel does not
state any specific area of inquiry that is essential to
a ruling on the motion for summary judgment or that is
otherwise relevant to this action and which was not
inquired into in the prior deposition.
There is,
therefore, no adequate showing that the Court's prior
order denying plaintiff's motion for continuance should
be altered, and there is no adequate showing that there
is any information material to a disposition of the
motion for summary judgment that has not previously
been covered in the extensive deposition heretofore
taken of Mr. Horman. The Court, having considered said
motion and affidavits, hereby denies the motion to
compel further deposition of Mr. Horman upon the ground
that the motion is contrary to the previous order of
the Court denying continuance of the hearing on the
motion for summary judgment and upon the ground that
nothing in the motion or affidavit in support thereof
shows any adequate grounds or basis for the granting of
said motion. (R.p. 595).
DAC

filed

its

Notice

of

Appeal

on

March

8,

1985.

(R.p. 599).
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendants submit the following statement of facts and

note that DAC has not provided the court with a proper statement
but has interposed "responses" and arguments at various points,
making its presentation argumentative.
DAC's Articles of Incorporation were filed in March of 1980,
with formal organization of the corporation becoming effective
September of 1980.
president,
unsuccessful

David

The chief directing officer of DAC was its
G.

attempts

Yurth,

who

to organize
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had

made

an athletic

several
club.

prior
(Yurth

deposition pp. 18-24; R.p. 607).

After formal incorporation,

Mr, Yurth commenced his efforts to find a location in which to
place a proposed athletic club.

Attention became centered on the

Harver Warehouse Building and other buildings either under lease
to or owned by entities related to Mr. Sidney M. Horman.

Mr.

Yurth approached Mr. Horman concerning the possibility of using
some of his building space in which to construct an athletic
club.

(Yurth deposition p. 59; R.p. 607).

After discussions

with Mr. Horman, Mr. Yurth was eventually allowed to use, on a
temporary basis, vacant office space on the second floor of the
Keith

Warshaw

historically

Building,

known.

or

the

Kress

Building

as

it

was

(Yurth deposition pp. 77-78; R.p. 607).

Somewhat later, on May 8, 1981, a written instrument entitled
"Construction and Lease Agreement for the Downtown Athletic Club11
(hereafter

referred

to as "Construction and Lease Agreement;"

Exhibit 11, Yurth deposition, Appendix "A" 1 ), pertaining to the
use of the Harver Warehouse Building for the construction of an
athletic club, was executed.

This instrument incorporated the

prior understanding that DAC could utilize office space in the
old Kress Building on a strict'ly temporary basis for a payment of
$1.00 per month rent until the main term of the lease began.
(Paragraph V A, pp. 3-4, Exhibit 11 to Yurth deposition, R.p.
607; Appendix "A").

The Construction and Lease Agreement also

*A copy of the Construction and Lease Agreement is attached as
Appendix "A," it is attached because the copy presented by DAC as
an attachment to its brief is inaccurate in that it does not
contain all of the handwritten modifications made to the
agreement at the time of signing, see e.g. page three of the
agreement.
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articulated

several

conditions

precedent

which

DAC

had

to

accomplish before S. M. Horman & Sons Co. became obligated to
construct any of the planned improvements or before the lease was
to commence.
It

Those conditions precedent were as follows:

The temporary occupancy "of the office space" in the

Kress Building was conditioned on the payment of rent of $1.00
per month.

(Paragraph 5A, p.3/ of the Construction and Lease

Agreement, Exhibit 11 to Yurth Deposition, Appendix "A"; Yurth
Deposition p. 77, R.p. 607; Horman deposition p. 193, R.p. 608).
2.

The improvements to be made by S. M. Horman & Sons

Company under the agreement were to be made only "provided that
the

Harver

Building

can

be

reinforced

at

a price

that

is

acceptable to Lessor [S. M. Horman & Sons Company] and Lessee
[DAC] and in a manner which will satisfy the requirements of the
Salt Lake City Building
Construction

and

Lease

Department."
Agreement,

(Paragraph

Exhibit

11

to

3Ar
the

of the
Yurth

Deposition; Appendix "A"; Yurth deposition p. 159; R.p. 607).
3.

Construction by S. M. Horman & Sons Company was to

commence only after "confirmed receipt and acceptance by Lessor
[S.

M.

Horman

&

acceptable to Lessor

Sons

Company]

of

construction

financing

[S. M. Horman & Sons Company]," and the

entire lease was specifically "subject to Lessor [S. M. Horman &
Sons Company] being able to secure sufficient financing . . . at
a rate not to exceed twelve percent (12%) per annum . . . ."
(Paragraph IV and VI(F), pp. 3 and 5 of the Construction and
Lease Agreement, Exhibit 11 to the Yurth Deposition; Appendix
"A").
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4.
with

S. M. Horman & Sons Company

construction

under

the

was required

agreement

only

if

to proceed

the

plaintiff

"shall sell a sufficient number of memberships prior to beginning
of construction • . . to guarantee that payments required by this
contract will be paid."
and Lease Agreement,

(Paragraph IV, p. 3 of the Construction

Exhibit

11 to Yurth deposition;

Appendix

"A") .
5.
amount

DAC was required "to assign dues income in a sufficient
to

guarantee

membership

contracts

said
by

payments

contract

according

number

to

to a

individual

special

account

designated solely for the payment of monthly lease payments due
and

payable

under

the

lease.M

(Paragraph

IV,

p.

3

of

the

Construction and Lease Agreement, Exhibit 11 to Yurth deposition;
Appendix "A"; Yurth deposition p. 83; R.p. 607).
None

of

these

conditions

precedent

to

the

defendants1

performance under the Construction and Lease Agreement have ever
been performed,
1.

The plaintiff did not pay the $1.00 per month rental

required by the temporary occupancy of the Kress Building office
space.

(Horman deposition

receipt

of

the

monthly

p. 140; R.p. 608).
rent

of

the

The purported

temporary

facilities

supposedly signed by defendant S. M. Horman, as agent for S. M.
Horman & Sons Company, filed with the Court was forged by DAC and
was

not

signed

by

Mr.

Horman.

(Affidavit

of

George

Throckmorton, R.p. 311; Horman deposition p. 186, R.p. 608).
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J.

2.

The Harver building could not be reinforced at a price

acceptable to the Lessor (S. M. Horman & Sons Company).

(Horman

deposition p. 2, R.p. 608; Yurth deposition p. 194r R.p. 607).
3.

The only engineering studies performed showed that the

Harver Building could not be made structurally sound within a
reasonable price range.

(Yurth deposition, pp. 165-167 and 194f

R.p. 607).
4.

No written engineering studies or completed drawings

providing for adequate structural reinforcement of the Harver
Building were submitted to Salt Lake City, and Salt Lake City has
never received or approved any plans for the renovation of the
Harver

Building.

(Affidavit

of

Roger

R.

Evans, Assistant

Director of the Department of Building and Housing Services for
Salt Lake City Corporation, R.p. 290).
5.

S. M. Horman & Sons Company did not receive or accept

construction financing acceptable to it.

(Horman deposition pp.

125-126, R.p. 608).
6.

Neither S. M. Horman & Sons Company nor DAC were able

to secure sufficient financing at a rate not to exceed 12% per
annum, or at a rate which was acceptable to S. M. Horman & Sons
Company.

(Yurth deposition, pp. 207, 224, 227, 229, 233, 235,

239, 240, 254; R.p. 607; Horman deposition p. 74; R.p. 608).
7.
sufficient

DAC

did

amount,

not
or

at

any

any

time assign
amount

dues

whatever,

income

in a

according

to

individual contract or any other manner to a special account
designated solely for the payment of lease properties.
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(Yurth

deposition p. 82 and 84, R.p. 607; Horman deposition pp. 90-91,
181 and 183, R.p. 608).
When it became clear that DAC was not going to be able to
perform as required under the Construction and Lease Agreement,
Mr. Yurth broached the possibility of an assignment of part of
the Harver Warehouse master lease to DAC.

The possibility of an

assignment was discussed by DAC and S. M. Horman & Sons Company,
but

no agreement

writing.

Even

to assign
if

for

was

purposes

ever
of

reached
this

or

motion

reduced

to

plaintiff's

contention that the discussions concerning the possibility of an
assignment of part of the Harver master lease constitute an oral
agreement to assign is accepted, there were specific material
conditions precedent acknowledged by both DAC and the defendants
which conditioned the assignment of the lease.

Those conditions

were as follows:
1.

That the owners of the Harver Building absolutely and

completely

release

obligations under

S.

M.

Horman

&

Sons

the lease and accept

Company

from

all

the proposed assignee

(DAC) as the new lessee in place of S. M. Horman & Sons Company.
(Paragraph 4 Section 1, Exhibit 15 to Yurth deposition, R.p. 607;
Horman deposition pp. 114, 175, 195, R.p. 608; affidavit of Brent
Dyer, R.p. 285).
2.

That engineering studies be completed and approved by

the City for the renovation of the Harver Building.

(Yurth

deposition p. 192, Paragraph (2), Exhibit 1 to Yurth deposition,
R.p. 607).
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3.

That

adequate

project be secured.

financing

for

the

completion

of

the

(Yurth deposition p. 192; R.p. 607).

None of the material conditions precedent to the alleged
oral assignment were ever fulfilled.

The owners of the Harver

lease refused to release S. M. Horman & Sons Company from any
obligation under the lease or to accept DAC as a lessee in place
of S. M. Horman & Sons Company (Horman deposition p. 19f R.p.
608).

The engineering studies were never completed and never

sent to the City for approval (Affidavit of Roger Evans; R.p.
290).

Adequate financing was never provided.

(Yurth deposition

pp. 207, 224, 227, 229, 233, 235, 239, 240 and 254; R.p. 607;
Affidavit of Sherman Gillman, officer in Transamerica Occidental
Life Insurance Company, Inc., R.p. 319)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in

denying DAC's motion for continuance and motion to compel the
taking of Sidney M. Horman's deposition.

Mr. Horman's deposition

had been taken and completed on April 26, 1985, seven months
prior to the hearing on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and

seven months before

Discovery.

the filing

of

the Motion

to Compel

Three days prior to the hearing on defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment, DAC filed nine notices of deposition and
its Motion for Continuance of the hearing.
Continuance was denied
response to the motion.

but

it was permitted

DAC's Motion for
to file written

DAC, thereafter, filed a Motion to

-12-

Compel seeking only the deposition of Mr. Hormanf thereby waiving
any claim to the other depositions.

DAC's untimely Motion to

Compel was denied for failing to demonstrate any basis for or
area

of

inquiry

deposition.

to

Thusf

justify
the

the

District

retaking
Court

of

did

Mr,
not

Horman's

abuse

its

discretion in denying DAC's motions and refusing to compel the
retaking of Mr. Horman's deposition where his deposition had been
completed and no area of inquiry was articulated which was either
relevant or pertinent to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment.
2.

The District Court did not err in granting defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment.

Five clear, unequivocal conditions

precedent

by

were

established

the

Construction

and

Lease

Agreement entered into by the parties, the failure of any one of
which would automatically terminate the agreement and release the
defendants

from

conditions

precedent

agreement

or

any

obligation
were

assignment

to perform.

performed.
alleged

by

The
DAC,

None

of

alternative
which

those
oral

necessarily

abrogated the prior written Construction and Lease Agreement, is
void and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
that

alleged

oral

agreement "to

assign

contained

Furthermore,
conditions

precedent which were not met by the plaintiff, thus, releasing
the defendants from any obligation to perform.
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DAC'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AND MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY,
As was outlined in the chronology of the proceedings of this

case, extensive discovery was conducted by both parties which
ended with the taking of Mr. Sidney M. Horman's deposition on
April 26, 1984.

After the lapse of three months the defendants

moved for summary judgment on July 19, 1984, and scheduled oral
argument for August 28, 1984, giving DAC six weeks in which to
respond.

A sixty-day extension of time from August 28, 1984, was

granted by the District Court upon motion by DAC.

(R«p* 380).

On November 2, 1984, more than four months after the filing of
the motion for summary judgment, and with absolutely no action on
the part of DAC to respond to the motion or otherwise plead,
defendants
November

again

noticed

16, 1984.

their motion

for oral argument

for

At the last minute DAC again sought an

extension of the hearing.
Counsel for DAC moved for a continuance at the time of the
hearing and stated as a basis for the motion that he could not
respond

to the motion

and

that

he need

additional

time to

complete the nine depositions he had noticed three days before
the oral argument.
At

the

November

16, 1984, hearing,

the

District

Court

considered DAC's Extraordinary Request for Review and Motion for
Continuance.

(R.pp. 386, 391).

-14-

The request

for review was

granted, but the Court declined to continue the hearing on the
Motion

for

Summary

Judgment,

position with respect

preferring

to that motion.

to

hear

counsel's

(R.pp. 386, 391).

The

Court did, however, give DAC an additional twenty days to submit
a

written

response.

(R.pp.

386,

391).

DAC

sought

and

granted still another extension to file its memorandum.
file within the twenty days, however,

was

It did

a Motion to Compel the

taking of the deposition of one of the nine depositions that had
been

noticed

three

days

prior

to

the

defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
compel
thereby

only

one

of

the

necessarily

nine

conceded

scheduled

lack

on

In seeking by motion to

depositions

the

hearing

of

noticed,
merit

in

plaintiff
its

prior

motion to continue the hearing in order to take nine depositions
and

acknowledged

ruling.
Mr.

the

appropriateness

of

the

District

Court's

The sole deposition sought was the further deposition of

Horman,

who

had

previously

been

deposed

more

than

seven

months prior to the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment.
DAC's Motion to Compel was never noticed for hearing, and no
oral argument was heard.
support

of the motion

deposition

of

continued.
articulate

Mr.

to the effect

Horman

(R.p. 395).
or

even

DAC's Counsel offered his affidavit in

was

not

that

the April

complete

and

26, 1984,

needed

to

be

Counsel's affidavit, however, did not

suggest

any

area

of

inquiry

that

was

not

covered in the prior deposition or that was in need of further
exploration.

There was no indication that even the unspecified

areas of inquiry were relevant

to the issues presented on the

Motion for Summary Judgment.
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The deposition six months earlier of the 80 year old Mr.
Horman had been exhaustive in both its breadth and depth of
inquiry and consumed an entire day and 243 pages of deposition
transcript.

As pointed

out by the affidavit

of defendants'

counsel/ it was inconceivable that any further area of relevant
inquiry could possibly exist.

Furthermoref

defense counsel's

affidavit made it clear that at the end of the deposition session
on April 26, 1984, the deposition was not continued indefinitely.
At the time the deposition was noticed, plaintiff's counsel had
instructed

and

required

that

available for two full days.
that demand.

Plaintiff's

Mr. Horman

and

his

lawyer

be

Schedules were rearranged to meet

counsel, however, obviously having

exhausted every conceivable avenue of inquiry, and having crossexamined

the

witness

with

reference

to

eighteen

document

exhibits, abruptly terminated the deposition at 4:30 p.m. on the
first day and advised that he did not wish to proceed further at
that time.
proceed

It was made clear that Mr. Horman was prepared to

further that day and the next as scheduled by DAC's

counsel, but DAC chose not to proceed.
Faced now with the necessity of producing some reasonable
objection

to

the

District

Court's

ruling,

in

light

of

the

District Court's lenient permission in granting extensions of
time to respond in writing to the defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, counsel for DAC has endeavored to justify its demand
for the further deposition of Mr. Horman.

Statements of Mr.

Horman's counsel reciting the witness's previous availability as
demanded by DAC's counsel and the absence of any need for further
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deposition were not challenged by DAC.

If DAC seriously believed

that the prior deposition was continued and that further inquiry
was

necessary,

inquiry
issue.

rather

it

would

than wait more

acted

promptly

to

complete

its

than seven months

to raise

the

A deposition can not be continued indefinitely.
In challenging

678 P.2d
P.2d

have

311, 313

this ruling DAC cites Cox v. Winters,

(Utah 1984), and Auerbach's v. Kimball, 572

376 (Utah 1977) which it claims stand for the proposition

that it is an abuse of discretion to enter summary judgment where
discovery is not completed.
In order

to properly consider DAC's challenge of the

District Court's rulings, it is expedient to establish what DAC
is contending and what it is not at issue.

First, DAC does not

contend that it was denied an opportunity under Rule 56(f), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, to obtain affidavits or other discovery
to oppose the motion for summary judgment, as was the case in Cox
v. Winters, supra.

DAC did not present to the Court, as required

by Rule 56(f), any acceptable "reason" why it either needed the
specific

nine depositions

it noticed

at

the

last

minute, and

thereafter abandoned when it sought by motion to compel only the
deposition of Mr. Horman, or why it could not present, without
those depositions, facts essential to justify its opposition to
the defendants' motion.
not

related

The notices of deposition were obviously

to the defendants' motion

for summary

judgment

in

that DAC did not pursue them and waived its right to compel their
taking.

The

unsigned

affidavits

submitted

by

DAC

with

Mr.

Yurth's assurances that the affiants would sign the affidavits if
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they could have been found are not proper under Rule 56(e) and do
not invoke Rule 56(f) to require the suspension of consideration
of the motion for summary judgment until the signatures could be
obtained.

No

signatures

were

acceptable
not

"reason"

obtained.

was

In

presented

additionr

why

Mr.

the

Yurth's

assurances that the affiants would sign the prepared affidavits
is disingenuous because the affiants in reality either could not
or would not sign them.
have

signed

the

For example, Mr. Maurice Green could not

affidavit

prepared

for

him

because

it

is

absolutely clear from the uncontroverted affidavit of Mr. Sherman
Gillman of Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company, (R.p.
319),

that

Occidental

Mr.

Green

Insurance

was

Life

never

Co. as

employed
a

loan

by

Transamerica

officer

and

never

obtained a loan commitment from Transamerica as represented in
his unsigned affidavit.

Mr. Grant Squires, a local residentr who

has always been available for signing the affidavit prepared by
DAC, informed defendants' counsel that he had refused to sign
that proffered affidavit.
under

Rule

56(f)

for

Thus, there is no appropriate claim
affidavits

or

discovery

to

oppose

defendants' motion since DAC has never presented any acceptable
reason

why

the

motion

should

not

be

heard

until

certain

affidavits or discovery are obtained.
Since Rule 56(f) is not at issue, the only issue that DAC
could apparently be raising is that since it has not completed
its general discovery
judgment.

the case can not be ripe for

summary

The cases cited by DAC in support of this proposition,

Cox and Auerbach'Sr hold almost completely the opposite.
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In Cox

the court quoted

Strand v. Associated

Students of

University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 194 (Utah 1977), citing 6 Part
2 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.) § 56.24, pp. 56-1424 to 151426 [sic], and stated that:
Where,
however,
the
party
opposing
summary
judgment timely presents his affidavit under Rule 56(f)
stating reasons why he is presently unable to proffer
evidentiary affidavits he directly and forthrightly
invokes the trial court's discretion. Unless dilatory
or lacking in merit the motion should be liberally
treated. Exercising a sound discretion the trial court
then
determines
whether
the
stated
reasons
are
adequate.
As noted DAC did not present any affidavit or move the court for
relief under Rule 56(f) and

in its motion for continuance and

motion to compel gave no reason why the taking of any of the
depositions had any relevance to the motion for summary judgment.
It

can

hardly

be

contested

compel were dilatory.

that

DAC's

notices

and motion

to

They were both filed more than four months

after defendants' motion for summary judgment was filed and seven
months

after

the

last

discovery

was

taken.

Finally,

Cox

admonishes the exercise of sound discretion in determining if the
"reasons stated for additional discovery are adequate."

Here,

where no reasons were offered,.'the District Court was proper in
not granting additional discovery.
Cox and Auerbach's
the

entry

of

summary

recognize three other

judgment

in

the

face

discovery would be an abuse of discretion:*

instances where
of

requests

for

first, where there

has "not been sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit
for plaintiff to utilize discovery procedures, and thereby have
an opportunity to cross examine the moving party,"
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Id. at 313?

second, where "discovery proceedings were timely initiated, but
never afforded an appropriate response/1
discovery

sought

is relevant

Id,

and third, where

to the issues presented

in the

motion for summary judgment and not a "'fishing expedition1 for
purely speculative evidence after substantial discovery has been
conducted without producing any significant evidence."

See also.

First National Bank v. Cities Services, 391 U.S. 253 (1968) cited
in Cox v. Winters, supra, at n. 9.
None of these three instances have any application here
other than the fact that they all indicate that the District
Court properly exercised its discretion.

DAC had ample time to

complete discovery in the eleven months after the suit was filed
and prior to the defendants' filing of its motion.

Again, DAC

did nothing in the three months prior to defendants filing of
their motion and then did nothing the following four months after
its filing.

It is noteworthy that defendants did not follow the

practice of some litigants, who give only the shortest possible
notice for hearing on a motion for summary judgment, but gave DAC
nearly

six

weeks

notice;

that

the

hearing

was

extended

at

plaintiffs' request an additional sixty days; and that even the
second notice of hearing gave DAC more than two weeks in which to
respond.

The last minute filing of notices of deposition just

before the hearing on the motion is clearly dilatory conduct on
the part

of DAC.

There was no outstanding, unresponded

to

discovery in existence prior to the filing of the motion for
summary

judgment, as was found in the case of both Cox and

Auerbach's.

In those cases, the outstanding discovery went to
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the various issues under consideration in the motion, and thus,
it was not proper for the court to enter summary judgment until
the

discovery

Defendants

had

was

properly

openly

and

responded

fairly

to.

responded

Here,
to

all

however,
discovery

propounded by DAC, and DAC had not only the opportunity to but
did in fact "cross examine the moving party."
and furtive attempt

to give the appearance

DAC's last minute
that discovery was

needed or incomplete was shown for what it is —
delay the proceeding.

an attempt to

DAC's abandonment of its untimely filed

discovery with its motion to compel being directed only to Mr.
Horman's further deposition demonstrates that the entire proposal
was nothing more than a "fishing expedition" frequently utilized
to avoid the salutary impact of summary judgment—a practice the
courts will not sanction.

Cox v. WinterSr

678 P.2d

311, 314

(Utah 1984), citing First National Bank v. Cities Services, 391
U.S. 253, 289 (1968).
The

District

Court

gave

efforts to delay the hearing.

careful
Since DAC

consideration

to

DAC's

offered no reasons for

the taking of the untimely filed discovery or its relevance to
issues raised in the motion for summary
Court

in the exercise of

motions.

judgment, the District

its discretion properly denied

DAC's

The court did, however, withhold decision and gave DAC

liberal and extended opportunity to make written response.
decision is above reproach.
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That

II-

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

IN GRANTING

The

which

Order

and

Summary

Judgment

DAC

DEFENDANTS'
appeals

from

articulated the basis for the granting of the Motion for Summary
Judgment•
Rule 56 requires that when a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported, as provided in the
rule, which is the case here, the response must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a 'genuine'
issue for trial. Rule 56 requires judgment if there is
no 'genuine' issue as to 'material' facts. The motion
for summary judgment has been amply supported, as
provided in the rule, and shows that there can be no
genuine issue that plaintiff has failed to comply with
several conditions precedent in the agreements upon
which plaintiff's complaint is based, and that the
alleged oral agreement or modification fails to meet
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
The
plaintiff's response has not shown that there is a
genuine issue as to any material fact, and the motion
for summary judgment must therefore be granted. There
is no reason for delay in entry of this judgment, and
summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's
complaint should be entered at this time."
(R.pp*
596-597).
It is axiomatic that when considering a motion for summary
judgment the Court must grant the motion where:
[t]he pleadings and all other submissions show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Healer Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980)
(Footnotes omitted).

It is equally clear that summary judgment

should not be precluded "simply whenever some fact remains in
dispute,

but

only

controverted."

Id.

Kesler,

583

P.2d

87

when

a

(Emphasis
(Utah

material
added).

1978),

fact

genuinely

See also. Kesler

citing

Disabled

Veterans v. Hendrixson, 340 P.2d 416 (Utah 1959).
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is

v.

American

As has been

stated by this Court recently in Webster v. Sill* 675 P.2d 1170,
1172 (Utah 1983):
A major purpose of summary judgment is to allow the
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether
there is a genuine issue of fact. To raise a genuine
issue of fact, an affidavit must do more than reflect
the affiant's opinions and conclusions . . . .
The
affidavit must 'set for the specific facts' showing
there is a genuine issue for trial. Utah R. Civil P.
56(e). The mere assertion that an issue of fact exists
without a proper evidentiary foundation to support that
assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a
summary judgment . . . .If (Citations omitted).
In keeping with the purpose of piercing the pleading on a
summary

judgment motion, the courts lay great

emphasis

on the

fact that an issue of fact must be "genuine" and "material."
the

often

quoted

language

raising of a genuine

of

Justice

issue of fact

Cardozo

concerning

the issue asserted

In
the

by the

opposing party must not be "feigned, and that there is in truth
.

. . [something] to be tried."

Currey v. McKenzie, 146 N.E.

375, 376 (N.Y. 1925).
As was noted by this Court in Webster, above, care should be
taken that issues raised are based on real and substantial facts
and not merely the opinions or conclusions of the affiant.

Also,

the courts are admonished that
An Affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment must set forth facts that would be admissible
in evidence.
Norton v. Blackman, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983).
have been especially
to

be

raised

by

The courts

careful to make sure that issues attempted

the

affidavit

of

an

sufficient to carry the matter to trial.
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interested

party

are

The long held test used

by the courts to review motions for summary judgment supported by
affidavits is similar to that of a directed verdict:
When a party presents evidence on which, taken by
itselfr it would be entitled to a directed verdict if
believed, and which the opposing party does not
discredit as dishonest, it rests upon that party at
least to specify some opposing evidence which it can
adduce and which will change the result.
Radio City Music Hall Corporation v. United States, 135 F.2d 715,
718 (2nd Cir. 1943).

See also Byner v. Mutual Life Insurance

Company of New York, 217 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1954).

("If

the

testimony presented by the affidavits is such that a directed
verdict would have to be granted, the Court is justified in
granting summary judgment . . .")

Finally, the courts have noted

that where there is a conflict summary judgment is apprpriate
where the "evidence on one or the hand is too incredible to be
accepted by reasonable minds or is without legal probative force
even if true . . . ."

Dewev v. Clark, 180 F.2d 766, 772 (D.C.

Cir. 1950).
Important to the District Court's ruling on the defendants'
Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

was

the

fact

that

the

Court

scrutinized the affidavits filed by the parties and on motion by
the

defendants

struck

three

improper under Rule 56(e).

of

DAC's

(R.p. 588).

"affidavits"

as being

Two of them were not

even signed by the purported affiant or notarized and amounted to
nothing more than what Mr. Yurth hoped they would state.

The

third was Mr. Yurth's own affidavit stating that he thought the
affiants in those two affidavits would state what he said they
would state.

The second affidavit filed by Mr. Yurth was replete
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with arguments, suppositions, hearsay and generally was contrary
to the mandate of Rule 56(e).
specific

inappropriate

The Court properly struck the

portions.

Thereafter,

the

court

in

keeping with the above cited authority, pierced the pleadings and
found that none of the alleged issues of fact loudly claimed by
DAC were genuine.

The Court noted that five clear conditions

precedent had to be met before the defendants were obligated to
perform under the agreement.

The Court found that the plaintiff

failed to meet any of the five grounds.

The failure of any one

of the five conditions precedent is sufficient.

DAC contends

that sufficient facts were disclosed in the pleadings and its
affidavits to raise genuine issues of fact.
conceded
failure

conditions
of

properly

their

and

precedent

and

performance

prudently

in

the

reveals

A review of the

facts
that

determining

surrounding
the

that

Court

there

the

acted

were

no

"genuine" and "material" issues of fact.
A.

CLAIMS UNDER
AGREEMENT.

THE

WRITTEN

CONSTRUCTION

AND

LEASE

The conditions precedent established in the Construction and
Lease

Agreement

between

the

parties

will

be

discussed

chronologically first, with the claims under the oral agreement
being discussed thereafter.
The Required Temporary
Rent was Not Paid.
As noted, DAC was permitted temporary occupancy of office
space

on

the

second

floor

of

the

vacant

Kress

Building

in

exchange for token monthly rents. When the Construction and Lease
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Agreement

was

signed,

the

temporary

occupancy

requirements was memorialized in that agreement.

and

rental

It stated,

"The parties hereby agree that effective with the date
of execution of this agreement that the Lessee shall
have the use of the premises for the sum of One Dollar
and no/100 ($1,00) per month with the additional
understanding that Lessee agrees to pay for his own
utilities. At such time as the improvements described
in paragraph 2 are substantially completed, the
permanent term of this lease shall commence
. . . .
The $1.00 per month herein refers to the office space
in the Kress Building. If Lessor leases this building,
Lessee will be required to relocate." (Paragraph V A
Construction and Lease Agreement; Appendix "A").
DAC made none of the required $1.00 rental payments as is clearly
and unequivocally established in the deposition of Mr. Horman.
(Horman deposition p. 186; R.p. 608).

DAC's principal officer,

David Yurth, contends that the $1.00 a month rental was paid 100
months in advance and as evidence of that prepayment submitted to
the Court

a purported

receipt

for

$100.

Mr. Yurth's naked

assertions that the rents were paid are not sufficient, however,
to raise a "material" or
unopposed

affidavit

of

"genuine" issue in the face of an

an

experienced

and

expert

examiner that the purported "receipt" was a forgery.

document

The receipt

for the 100 months rent, which Mr. Yurth indicates is evidence of
payment of the monthly rentals, was uncontrovertibly established
as a forgery (see the affidavit of the handwriting expert, George
J. Throckmorton, R.p. 34), and the documents from which it was
forged were those found with DAC and its principal officer, Mr.
David Yurth.

(See affidavit of Stephen D. Peterson, R.p. 297)

Although the rent is insignificant in amount, the failure of DAC
to present

any

credible

evidence
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whatever

to overcome

this

unopposed

evidence

of

forgery

places

all

of

Mr.

Yurth's

statements in question.
The Harver Building Could
Not be Reinforced as Required.
to the defendants1

Another condition precedent
was

that

construction

would

be

contingent

upon

performance

whether

"the

Harver Building can be reinforced at a price that is acceptable
to Lessor

[defendants], and

requirements
(Paragraph
"A").

of

III

the
B,

Salt

in a manner

that will satisfy the

Lake

Building

Construction

City

and

Lease

Department.11

Agreement;

Appendix

This condition precedent has two parts which must both be

completed.

First, the cost of reinforcing the building for the

the intended use as an athletic club must be acceptable to the
defendants.

Second, the proposed reinforcement must satisfy the

requirements of the Salt Lake City Building Department.
Nowhere can DAC point to any piece of evidence that suggests
that

the

defendants

have

reinforcement acceptable.
building

could

requirements

of

be
the

ever

the

proposed

cost

of

While DAC makes the argument that the

reinforced
Salt

found

Lake

in

a

City

manner
Building

to

satisfy

Department

the
(and

perhaps we must concede that anything is possible), DAC has not
and can not overcome the undisputed fact that after the lapse of
four years from the 1981 Construction and Lease Agreement to the
date of the hearing or the motion for summary judgment, Salt Lake
City had never approved any proposed reinforcement scheme and no
satisfactory reinforcement scheme had been presented to the City
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(Affidavit of Assistant Director of the D€*partment of Buildingf
Roger Evans, R.p. 290)
Much of DAC's argument centers on engineering studies. This
is understandable, because before the cost of reinforcement can
be determined,

and

before

it can

be determined

building can be reinforced in a manner
requirements

of

the

Salt

Lake

City

engineering studies must be completed.

whether

the

that will satisfy the
Building

Department,

From these studies costs

can be determined and the Building Department's approval sought.
Initially, DAC retained Bonneville Engineering to do the
engineering

and

seismic

studies

to

determine

whether

the

warehouse could be renovated and reinforced to comply with local
building code requirements.

(Yurth deposition, p. 138, R.p.

607).

made

Bonneville

Engineering

extensive

studies

of

the

building and reached the preliminary finding that, to meet the
building code requirements, either the existing building would
have to be demolished and a new one constructed or the entire
building—every beam, column, corner brace and floor area—would
have to be reinforced, costing an estimated $150,000 per floor.
This price was not acceptable m to the defendants, and this is
admitted by Mr. Yurth.
607.)

(Yurth deposition, pp. 147-148, R.p.

Bonneville Engineering did not prepare a written report of

its finding for DAC but only presented these preliminary findings
orally.

(Yurth deposition, p. 148, R.p. 607).

DAC was not satisfied with Bonneville Engineering's finding
and determined to engage another engineering firm, Ronald Weber
and Associates, to do follow-up structural analysis.
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(Yurth

deposition, p. 153, R.p. 607.)

It is admitted

obtained

Ronald

a

written

(Yurth deposition,

report

from

Weber

that DAC never
and

pp. 214, 215, R.p. 607).

Associates.

In the

face of

repeated requests in this case, both formally and informally, DAC
has never provided
whatever

from

plaintiff

has

the defendants with any engineering

Ronald

Weber

conceded

and

that

it

Associates.
expected

In

the

studies

fact,

result

of

the
the

engineering studies to be that the Harver Warehouse is unusable
for

the

purpose

proposed

and

that,

short

of

demolishing

the

building, it could not be renovated in an economically feasible
fashion.

(Yurth deposition, p. 194, R.p. 607).

It is also uncontested

that no final engineering reports,

architectural drawings, etc. were ever submitted to the Salt Lake
City

Building

Assistant
Services

Department.

Director
for

Salt

of

the

Lake

The

affidavit

Department

City

of

of

Building

Corporation,

shows

Roger

Evans,

and

Housing

that

he

has

responsibility for determining whether plans and specifications
meet the requirements of the building code and that
"[n]either Mr. Yurth, the Downtown Athletic Club, Inc.,
nor
anyone
has
ever
submitted
any
plans,
specifications, engineering reports or the requested
seismic analysis, or any other documents which are
necessary to undertake a review of the project by the
Department. Accordingly, the City Building Department
has never had and does not now have any basis on which
to approve any building permits for the construction of
the proposed health club facility." (R.p. 293-294).
Since no engineering report has ever been provided to DAC, to the
defendants, or to the City which would indicate that the Harver
Warehouse
building

could

be

economically

reinforced

to

meet

the

code requirements, this clear condition precedent
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City
was

not

met

and

DAC

has

breached

a

material

condition

of

the

Construction and Lease Agreement.
DAC attempts to rebut these established facts by reference
in its brief to certain pages from Mr. Yurth*s deposition wherein
Mr. Yurth discusses his suspicions concerning the preparation of
engineering reports which were not as DAC hoped.

It should be

noted from those paragraphs/ however, that there is nothing cited
to indicate that in fact any engineering reports were actually
prepared.

All that is alluded to by DAC is the already well

established fact that only oral reports of the engineering and
price studies had been received by DAC.
The affidavit of Scott Evans which allegedly outlines the
engineering

work

relied

on

by DAC does

question the establisheded facts.

not

even

call

into

Mr. Evans' affidavit reveals

that the engineering work, a written report of which was never
seen by DAC (Yurth deposition p. 194; R.p. 607) and drawings he
prepared

H

constituted

the

basis

for

the preliminary

approval for the building permits by the City."

concept

(R.p* 476). Mr.

Evans also describes a meeting with Roger Evans regarding a
proposed

or

renovations.
was ever

preliminary

plan

(R.p. 475-476).

submitted

for

to

accomplish

the

necessary

He does not assert that anything

approval

to the City

or

that

final

engineering and price studies were ever presented to defendants
that indicated the building could be renovated at an acceptable
price.
DAC has presented nothing that contravenes the affidavit of
the Assistant Director of Building and Housing Services for Salt
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Lake City Corporation and has presented nothing to raise any
question that defendants have ever found even any proposed cost
of reinforcement acceptable.
Thus,

neither

part

of

the

two-part

requirement

of this

condition precedent was fulfilled.
No Financing Acceptable to
Lessor was Provided.
The

agreement

was

(defendants) receiving

specifically
and accepting

conditioned
financing

upon

lessee

"acceptable to

lessor" with interest rates not in excess of 12%.
Paragraph 4 of the Construction and Lease Agreement provided
that:
"Lessor [defendants] agrees that the construction of
the improvements . . . shall be commenced not later
than seven days following confirmed receipt and
acceptance by Lessor [defendants] of construction
financing acceptable to Lessor [defendants] at the
offices of the lender of Lessor's [defendant's] choice
and
shall
be
completed
within
twelve
months
thereafter." (Appendix "A").
In

paragraph

VI

of

the

Construction

and

Lease

Agreement,

subparagraph (f) it provides that:
"This lease is subject to Lessor [defendants] being
able to secure sufficient financing . . . at a rate not
to exceed twelve percent' [12%] per annum and that
Lessee [DAC] shall pay all annual interest charges in
excess of twelve percent [12%] per annum, provided that
if the Lessor [defendants] does decide to pay a higher
interest rate than twelve percent (12%), the annual
interest rate is acceptable to the Lessee [DAC]."
(Appendix "A").
Thus the acquisition and approval of financing acceptable to
the defendants was a condition precedent to construction.

The

loan to be received and approved by the defendants was not to
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exceed twelve percent per annum unless defendants decided to
accept and approve a higher rate, and then DAC was required to
pay all excess interest above 12% if it decided to accept the
higher interest rate.

Subparagraph (f) of paragraph VI of the

Construction and Lease Agreement makes it clear that it is the
defendants' option whether to accept financing at a rate greater
than twelve percent, i.e., if the defendants are willing to
accept the risk of greater interest charges. DAC can not force
the defendants to accept financing above the 12% range, but if
the defendants chose to accept an interest rate greater than 12%r
DAC would then have to approve that rate since it would have to
pay the added cost.

Thusf it is clear under this provision that

the defendants could reject any and all financing which had an
annual interest rate greater than 12%.
As established in both the depositions of Mr. Horman and Mr.
Yurth, efforts, were made by the defendants to secure financing
which would conform to the requirements of the Construction and
Lease Agreement.

(Horman depositionr pp. 60-66; 74-75r R.p. 608;

and Yurth deposition pp. 179, 180, R.p. 607), but defendants were
unable to find any financing.
608).

(Horman deposition pp. 74-74, R.p.

DAC, as a prospective lessee, also attempted to provide

construction and take out financing.

After considerable and

extensive efforts on its part, it also was unable to provide
suitable financing.

(Yurth deposition, pp. 207, 224, 227, 229,

232, 233, 235, 239, 240, 247, 254, 256, 262, 265, 275, R.p. 607).
At no time in its extensive search for financing was DAC able to
provide both adequate construction financing and suitable take-
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out financing which would meet the requirements of the terms of
the

Construction

and

Lease

Agreement.

Thus

this

condition

precedent was never fulfilled.
In an effort

to raise an issue that does not exist, DAC

relied in the District Court on a supposed commitment which it
claims

is

in

a

letter

written

by

one

Maurice

Green

on

letterhead of Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company.
reading of that

letter,

607), shows that
certainly

(Exhibit

it is clearly

is not a commitment

the
A

33 to Yurth Deposition, R.p.
not a commitment

of any

of Transamerica, but

kind,

is nothing

more than Mr. Green's unsubstantiated assertion that he could get
financing.

This is the Mr. Green who supposedly would testify as

set forth in the unsigned purported affidavit submitted by DAC
under his name through whom DAC claims it paid to Transamerica a
commitment fee of $7,500.
judgment,

defendants

In support of the motion for summary

submitted

the

affidavit

of

Mr.

Sherman

Gillman, the investment officer of Transamerica Occidental Life
Insurance Company, which

establishes that Mr. Green was nothing

more than a life insurance salesman, was not a loan officer of
Transamerica, had no authority to loan or commit funds on behalf
of

Transamerica,

that

the

letters

relied

on

by

DAC

were

not

mailed with knowledge or authority of Transamerica, that not only
did

Transamerica

obtain
never

another
even

never

source

received

a

received any commitment
DAC.

(R.p. 319-321).

make
of

any

commitment

financing

loan

to

loan

funds

or

for

DAC,

but

Transamerica

application

from

DAC

and

has

not

fee of $7,500 or any other amount from
In the face of this affidavit filed with
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the motion over four months before the hearing, DAC is unable to
come up with any contrary statement from the now elusive Mr.
Green from whom DAC obtained, apparently with easer the letters
relied upon.

DAC's strained effort to refute this does notf to

say the least, create a "genuine" issue of material fact.
DAC's

only

other

effort

to

avoid

the

unquestioned

and

dispositive failure to meet the conditions precedent does not
present an issue of fact which would defeat the summary judgment
but rather quibbles about

the meaning of the contract provision.

The contract provisions are clear and are questions of law, not
fact, to be resolved by the courts.
Like the other conditions precedent, this one failure alone
is sufficient to sustain the District Court's entry of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.
No Assignment of Dues
Income was Made to a
Special Account for Payment
of the Monthly Leasing Expenses.
The Construction and Lease Agreement provides that:
"In addition, it is agreed and understood that Lessor
[defendants] shall construct the improvements called
for in this lease with the understanding that Lessee
[DAC] shall sell a sufficient number of memberships
prior to beginning construction of the Athletic Club to
guarantee that the payments required by this contract
will be paid; Lessee [DAC] agrees to assign dues income
in a sufficient amount to guarantee said payments
according
to individual membership contracts by
contract number to a special account designated solely
for the payment of monthly lease payments due and
payable under the terms of this lease. These contracts
must be acceptable to Lessor [defendants] and the
mortgage loan company." (Appendix "A", paragraph IV).
Because defendant was concerned about DAC's ability to make
payment

it

was

required

that

-34-

DAC

establish

that

enough

memberships

had been sold and that dues payable under those

contracts would be sufficient to meet DAC's obligations.
two conditions precedent were created —

Thus,

DAC must sell sufficient

memberships to guarantee required payments and there must be an
assignment of sufficient dues income to cover those payments.
Both of these conditions precedent were unfulfilled.

There

was never any indication that a sufficient number of memberships
were sold by DAC as required, andDAC has to date never provided
proof of the sale of those memberships.

Also DAC admits that no

"special account designated solely for the payment of monthly
lease

payments

established.

due

and

(Yurth

payable

under

deposition,

pp.

this

Lease"

82-86;

was

R.p.

ever
607).

Furthermore, the Construction and Lease Agreement required that
dues income be assigned to the "special account" by specific
membership contract number.

Although Mr. Yurth has provided a

supposed account at the Citizens Bank, that account in no way
satisfies this contractual requirement.

(Yurth deposition, pp.

82-86, R.p. 607). Moreover, whatever bank accounts the plaintiff
did

maintain,

there

was

never

any

attempt

to

establish

a

procedure to assign dues income by specific contract number to
those accounts or to preserve the accounts as required by the
agreement.
DAC asserts that a question of fact exists on this issue yet
makes no reference to any fact in the record or elsewhere.

Since

there is nothing in the record to rebut the failure of this
condition precedent, DAC raises for the first time in this appeal
the issues of waiver and estoppel and off-handedly asserts that
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defendants

be

estopped

to

deny

the

nonperformance

of

the

condition precedent or that they have waived this requirement.
These issues were never

pled nor raised before the District

Court either by oral agreement or written memorandum.

Where an

issue is raised for the first time on appeal and was not argued
before the District Court this Court has declined to address the
merits of the argument.

Smith v. Vuicich, 8 UAR 5 (Utah 1985)

citing Almon, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission. slip. op.
18637,
Company,

filed

February

Inc.,

7,

slip,

op.,

1985?

Bundv

18270,

v.

filed

Century
November

Equipment
2,

1984.

Regardless of its failure to properly raise these issues, DAC's
mere assertion of an estoppel or waiver are insufficient to raise
a question of fact where it has provided nothing upon which to
base its arguments.

DAC has offered nothing by way of affidavits

or otherwise to establish facts that would justify a claim of
estoppel or of waiver.

Where DAC has failed to provide the

necessary factual basis for its legal assertions they do not
raise any questions of fact which would require the setting aside
of the summary judgment.
None of these conditions precedent have been fulfilled,
and the record before the Court stands undisputed.

The District

Court found that DAC did not raise any genuine issues of fact
regarding the failure to fulfill these conditions precedent and
properly entered summary

judgment in favor of the defendants.

The failure of any one of the conditions precedent will justify
the District

Court's

ruling and
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in this appeal DAC has not

succeeded in raising a question about the fulfillment of any one
of the conditions precedent.
B.

THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT TO ASSIGN.
In

its

complaint,

DAC

separate, alternative agreements.

alleges

the

breach

of

two

The first is a breach of the

written Construction and Lease Agreement, and the second is an
alleged oral agreement to assign a part of the Harver Warehouse
master lease to DAC.

In its written memorandum in the District

Court, DAC, with new counsel on the scene, for the first time in
an attempt to "clarify" the nature of its claim, shifted and
contended that, rather than superseding the original Construction
and Lease Agreement and creating a new agreement, the alleged
oral agreement to assign was actually an oral modification of the
prior

agreement.

Regardless

of

whether

the

alleged

oral

agreement worked as an oral modification or superseded the prior
agreement, the oral agreement

was void under

the Statute of

Frauds and was subject to several clear conditions precedent that
were not met.
1.

THE ORAL AGREEMENT IS VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.
The application of the Statute of Frauds to an

alleged oral agreement is a question of law proper for resolution
in a motion for summary judgment.

The Utah Statute of Frauds

applies to the transaction at issue here, since it deals with the
creation, granting, assignment or surrendering of an estate or
interest in real property.

U.C.A. 25-5-1. The Statute of Frauds

requires that any agreement which falls within its parameters
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must be in writingf with a clear statement of the essential terms
and conditions/ and the writing must be signed by the party being
charged.

Greoerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369f 374 (Utah 1980);

Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974); Birdzell v. Utah
Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412f 242 P.2d 578 (1952).
Where
Frauds/

the original

any

subsequent

agreement
agreement

is within
which

the

Statute of

alters/ modifies/ or

amends it must also satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

Strevell-

Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 640 P.2d 741/ 742 (Utah 1982);
Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P. 2d 1319/ 1322 (Utah 1975);
Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535/ 569/ 267 P.2d
1020/ 1032 (1928).
It is elementary that when a contract is required to be
in writing/ the same requirement applies with equal force to
any alteration or modification thereof. More importantly
herer any such modifying agreement must be sufficiently
certain and unequivocal in its terms that the parties will
understand what it is and what is to be done under it.
Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, supra.

DAC has produced no

written memorandum of the terms of the modification whatsoever.
Furthermore/ there is no signature of the defendant which would
give any authenticity to those alleged terms.
DAC attempted to rely on the doctrine of part performance to
salvage the oral modification from the bar of the Statute of
Frauds.

In order to effectively rescue the oral modification

from the bar of the Statute of Frauds by use of the doctrine of
part performance and to assert liability against the defendants,
the

plaintiff

overcome.

has

several

stumbling

blocks

which

must

be

First/ the acts of part performance relied upon to
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remove the alleged oral modification from the statute of frauds
must be exclusively referrable to the oral modification and not
to any other obligation.
P.2d

611, 614

Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534

(Utah 1975).

Where the acts relied on as part

performance relate to any other agreement, they cannot support a
claim

of

part

performance.

Zions

Properties,

Inc. v.

Holt,

supra.
In McDonald v. Barton Bros. Investment Corp., 631 P.2d 851,
853 (Utah 1981), this Court wrote:
The controlling issue on this appeal is . . .
whether the alleged acts of part performance were
themselves referrable and done in pursuance of that
contract.
If the acts relied on were not done in the
execution of the oral contract but can be explained on
other grounds, they are insufficient to remove the bar
of the Statute of Frauds, and the contract is
unenforceable. [Citation omitted.]
As explained, in In re: Roth Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 44, 269 P.2d
278,

281

(1954),

the reason for this requirement

is that

"the

equitable doctrine of part performance is based on estoppel, and
unless the acts of part performance are exclusively referrable to
the contract, there is nothing to show that the plaintiff relied
on it or changed his position to his prejudice, so as to give
rise to an estoppel."

Similarly, in Bradshaw v. McBride, 649

P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982), this Court declined to apply the part
performance doctrine because

"there was an explanation

for the

purchase of the adjoining property other than the oral contract
to sell."
that

Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953), cautions

"[t]he doctrine

is to be applied with great care, paying

attention to the policy expressed in the Statute of Frauds and
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historical precedent where the limits have been defined by the
process of inclusion and exclusion."

In Price v. Lloyd. 31 Utah

86, 86 P. 767, 772 (1906), this Court stated:
Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine
invoked by the plaintiff, have not, by any means,
intended to annul the Statute of Frauds, but only to
prevent its being made the means of perpetrating a
fraud. In order that a plaintiff may be permitted to
give evidence of a contract not in writing, and which
is in the very teeth of the statute and a nullity at
law, it is essential that he establish, by clear and
'positive proof, acts and things done in pursuance and
on account thereof, exclusively referrable thereto, and
which take it out of the operation of the Statute.
DAC has not alleged any acts of part performance relating
exclusively to the oral modification which would work to protect
it from the bar of the Statute of Frauds.

All of the acts

alleged, including the engineering studies and the financing, are
requirements of the original Construction and Lease Agreement and
do not relate exclusively to the alleged oral modification.
2.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT
HAVE NOT BEEN MET.

If the discussions between Mr. Yurth and Mr. Horman could in
any way be construed as amounting to an oral agreement to assign
or to modify, that agreement's purpose would have been to effect
a transfer of property subject to the Construction and Lease
Agreement.

There has never been any dispute that

alleged oral agreement

was conditioned

even the

on nearly all of the

conditions precedent to the written agreement.

(R.p. 367-8).

DAC does not attempt to refute that these conditions precedent
exist but only contends that those conditions were fulfilled.
See Appellate Brief p. 15.

Those conditions precedent are:
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Firstr DAC agreed to provide complete and acceptable engineering
reports

to the City and

renovation project,

to get

the City's approval

(R.p. 367, paragraph (2)1.)-

of the

Second, DAC

acknowledged that under its theory of the purported agreementf it
would provide

suitable construction

(R.p. 368, paragraph (2)2.).
prior

to

any

assignment,

and

long

term

financing.

Third, it was agreed by DAC that
there

would

be

an

absolute

and

irrevocable release of S.M. Horman & Sons Co. from the Harver
master lease. (R.p. 367, paragraph (1)4.).
No Engineering Reports
Were Submitted and
Approved by the City*
DAC recognized that just as with the written agreement a
prerequisite
lease,

by

to any conveyance of any portion of the Harver
assignment

engineering

studies

be

or

otherwise,

complete

and

was
a

the

viable

completion
plan

for

of
the

reinforcement or the renovation of the warehouse be approved.
(Yurth Deposition pp. 192, 196, 200? R.p. 607, R.p. 367).
As discussed earlier at p. 27 to p. 31 engineering reports
and cost estimates were never provided by any of the alleged
engineering firms who were retained to do those studies.
great

importance,

submitted

to the

however,
Salt

Lake

was
City

Housing Services for approval.
R.p.

290,

296).

The

the

fact

Department

nothing
of

was

Of
ever

Building and

(See affidavit of Roger Evans,

failure

of

DAC

to

provide

complete

engineering studies to the City is significant, because without
the City's approval andproper permits issued renovation would be
impossible.
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No Suitable Financing
Was Ever Provided.
Just as with the written agreement, it was a condition
precedent under the alleged oral agreement to the granting of any
interest in the Harver lease by defendants that DAC would provide
suitable construction and long-term financing.
pp. 192, 196, and

(Yurth Deposition

200; R.p. 607; "Minutes of the Executive

Committee Meeting" for September 23, 1981.

(R.p. 367).

DAC was

unable to provide adequate construction or long-term financing at
any time (See discussion above at p. 31 to 34). Because DAC has
failed to rebut the factual assertions made by the defendants and
because no issues of fact were raised, the District Court's entry
of summary judgment was proper.
An Absolute Assignment
And Release was Not Provided.
One final condition precedent of tremendous importance to
defendants was the requirement

that defendants

be completely

released from the Harver lease as part of any assignment and DAC
be substituted as lessee.
that

For example, "Minutes" of DAC reveal

it knew of the importance of this condition precedent.
The possibility that DAC may at some further time
become insolvent and therefore unable to meet its lease
and mortgage payments will require that the owner of
the property agree to an absolute and irrevocable
assignment of the master lease so that Mr. Horman et.
al. will have no further exposure to obligations
requiring future payments. (R.p. 367)
Mr. Brent

Dyer, a participant

brought

discussions between DAC and defendants,
202, R.p. 607), in his affidavit
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by DAC

into the

(Yurth deposition, p.

confirmed

the fact

that a

complete

and

absolute

release

was

a

prerequisite

to

any

assignment of the Harver lease (R. p. 285-289).
DAC concedes that no release could be obtained, which makes
the

failure

of

this

requirement

uncontrovertable.

(Yurth

deposition p. 11 of corrections to deposition, R.p. 607). Since
this failure of this condition precedent is uncontrovertablef DAC
has made

an unfounded

condition precedent.

attempt

to change

the nature

of the

DAC has attempted to change the absolute

and complete release from the lease to one which requires only
indemnification —

a drastically different condition.

of its contention

In support

that only indemnification was required DAC

offered Mr. Yurth's deposition and an affidavit of Mr. Richard
Clissold.

From a brief review of both references, however, it is

evident that neither raise any issues of fact concerning either
the nature of requirement or the fact that it was unfulfilled.
In his deposition, Mr. Yurth affirmed and reaffirmed that it
was DAC's clear understanding
complete and
condition

irrevocable

precedent

to

that defendants must

release from the master
any

proposed

deposition, p. 211, 313, R.p," 607).
altered

his

deposition

"clarifications

of

the

transcript
testimony."

receive a
lease as a

assignment.

(Yurth

Mr. Yurth subsequently
by

filing
These

14

pages

of

"clarifications"

consist of substantial modification of his testimony with regard
to his previous description of meetings in which the alleged oral
agreement to assign were dicussed and the conditions precedent
were articulated.
in

agreement

Where originally his deposition testimony was

with

contemporaneous
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corporate

minutes,

his

"clarifications" were artfully drawn to avoid the impact of the
prior record.

These "clarifications/1 and Mr. Yurth's efforts to

blunt the effect of the clear admissions made at the taking of
his deposition must be cautiously analyzed as the District Court
obviously did.

Furthermoref

these "clarification" showed the

inherent unreliability of his testimony and this coupled with the
unopposed affidavit of the handwriting expert showing submission
by DAC of a forged document

to the Court makes Mr. Yurth's

testimony inherently unreliable.

These methods make plaintiff's

entire argument suspect, [cf. Webster v. Still, 675 P.2d 1170
(Utah 1983); Dewey v. Clark, supra.1, and certainly canot be said
to raise a "genuine issue of fact."
Mr. Clissold's
concerning

his

affidavit

offers nothing

"understanding"

of

the

terms

but his opinion
of

the alleged

agreement to assign, (R.p. 496), and can not serve to overcome.
Such an affidavit is insufficient to raise a question of fact.
Webster v. Still, supra, at 1172.
Under these circumstances, where DAC has done nothing to
rebut the factual assertions made by defendants and where no
questions of fact have been raised by DAC as to its compliance
with the conditions precedent, the District Court's entry of
summary judgment should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
In this appeal DAC has presented nothing which would merit
reversal of the District Court's summary judgment.

Proper and

sound discretion was exercised in denying DAC's untimely request
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to

further

depose

a party

previously

deposed.

No

reasons

whatever were given for the requested discovery, and there was no
showing that the proposed discovery was directed to any issues
material to the motion for summary judgment.
DACfs brief monotonously reiterates that questions of fact
were raised but does not provide any meaningful citation to any
fact established

by appropriate affidavit, or deposition, or

document which would establish a genuine issue as to any material
fact.

It is established by unrebutted affidavits, depositions,

the plaintiffs1 own documents, and by admissions of DAC's chief
officer that both the written and oral agreements relied upon by
plaintiffs were premised on the conditions precedent and that
those conditions remain to this day totally unperformed.
alleged

oral

agreement, taking

DAC's

argument

at

The

its best,

remains simply an alleged oral agreement without the writing
required by the Statute of Frauds.
During the course of four years, DAC was unable to perform
as it agreed in the agreements which form the basis of its suit.
In an effort to avoid the consequence of this failure, it has
filed a complaint that is without substance, presented to the
court

a

forged

deposition

document,

testimony,

and

substantially
presented

"corrected"
unsigned

and

damaging
unsworn

affidavits and affidavits clearly contrary to the requirements of
Rule 56(e).

Even those responses to the motion for summary

judgment were untimely, and the frenetic effort of DAC to avoid
the summary judgment simply further confirms the frivolous nature
of

the case

it had

filed.

This
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is precisely

the type of

complaint that Rule 56 is designed to dispose of.

The summary

judgment should be affirmed*
DATED this /J

day of July, 1985.
FOX, EDWARDS, JGARDINER & BROWN

L/Gafd iner, Jr.
David B. Thomas
Attorneys for Defendants
Respondent
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t

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE^
I hereby certify that on the
caused

a

Respondent

true
to

and

correct

be

served

copy
by

/ ^
of

the

mailing

plaintiff/appellant's attorneys:
Lorin N. Pace
G. Randall Klimt
William B. Parsons
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS
University Club Building
Suite 1200
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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day of July, 1985, I
foregoing
a

copy

Brief

thereof

of
to

APPENDIX "AM

CONSTRUCTION

AND LEASE

AGREEMENT

FOR

THE DOWNTOWN

ATHLETIC

CLUB

This Agreement
executed
by and between S, M. HORMAN
AND
S O N S , a p a r t n e r s h i p , hereinafter referred
to as "Lessor," and
DOWNTOWN
ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ,
hereinafter
referred
to as " L e s s e e . "

Premises.
The premises included in this Agreement are
I
part of the Harver W a r e h o u s e Building and/or part of the Kress
Building and/or part of the Grant B u i l d i n g , located in downtown
Salt Lake City, Utah, as more particularly described and shown on
Exhibit A, which is a property d e s c r i p t i o n of the building(s) to
be used.
In the event that any or all of said buildings are
d e m o l i s h e d , the premises shall be located in the new buildings
built upon the same locations where the referenced buildings are
presently located.
II
Occupancy.
It is the intent of the parties to this
Agreement that Lessee shall have occupancy of the portions of the
" p r e m i s e s " as more p a r t i c u l a r l y described as f o l l o w s :
A.

basement
location,
Harver W a r e h o u s e B u i l d i n g — T h e
ground l e v e l , sec
cond floor and roof level of the
Harver W a r e h o u s e Building l o c a t i o n , as more particularly described and shown on the floor plans
attached hereto as Exhibits A(1) through A(5) f ^ ^ c a ^ ^
V/^j^/

B,

plans

attached

hereto

III
Construction.~
Lessor
expense
to make
the
following
premises as f o l l o w s :
A.

as Exhibit

B.

agrees
at
its sole
improvements
to the

cost
and
described

Harver W a r e h o u s e B u i l d i n g — L e s s o r
shall
install
all permanent improvements for the basement l e v e l ,
ground l e v e l , second floor, new third floor, and
new roof level of the Harver Warehouse Building
location
including
heating,
ventilation,
air
conditioning,
electrical
systems,
plumbing,
sprinkling
s y s t e m s , fire s y s t e m s , stairways
and

walkways, lighting, interior and party walls,
decking, and all engineering, architectural and
structural work related thereto sufficiently to
cause the premises to house the facilities shown
in the floor plan as more particularly described
and shown as floor plans on Exhibits A(1) through
(H), provided that the Harver Building can be
reinforced at a price that is acceptable to Lessor
and Lessee, and in a manner which will satisfy the
requirements of the Salt Lake City Building Department,
All costs of remodeling and construction shall be borne by Lessor provided, however,
that Lessee shall provide its own leasehold improvements and furnishings on said premises.
Lessor and Lessee agree and Lessor understands
that Lessee's leasehold improvements shall be
considered by the Lessor and Lessee to specifically include, be defined and shall further be
considered as the Lessee's personal property, all
furnishings, removable fixtures, appliances,
removable equipment and machinery as more particularly described and shown on Exhibit C.
B.

Grant Building—Lessor shall install all permanent
improvements for the main level of the Grant
Building including heating, ventilation, air
conditioning, electrical
systems, plumbing,
sprinkling systems, fire systems, stairways and
walkways, lighting, interior and party walls,
decking, and all engineering, architectural and
structural work related thereto sufficiently to
cause the premises to house the facilities shown
in the floor plan as more particularly described
and shown on Exhibits B C D and (2), provided that
the Grant Building can be remodeled at a price
that is acceptable to both Lessor and Lessee, and
in a manner which will satisfy the requirements of
the Salt Lake City Building Department, All costs
of remodeling and construction shall be borne by
Lessor provided, however, that Lessee shall provide its own leasehold improvements and furnishings on said premises.
Lessor and Lessee agree
and Lessor understands that Lessee's leasehold
improvements shall be considered by the Lessor and
Lessee to specifically include, be defined and
shall further be considered as the Lessee's personal property, furnishings, removable fixtures,
appliances, removable equipment and machinery as
more particularly described and shown on Exhibit
D,

In addition, the Lessor and Lessee understand and agree that the
Lessor may modify, change or alter the design specifications
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contained in the floor plans as more particularly described and
shown on Exhibits A(1) and ( 2 ) f B(1) and ( 2 ) , C and D as required
by applicable governmental and regulatory agencies sufficient to
obtain building permits and the final c e r t i f i c a t e of completion
for the project.
of
Performance.
Lessor agrees that the construction
IV
improvements described
above and as more particularly
described and shown on Exhibits A and B shall be commenced
not
later than seven days following confirmed receipt and acceptance
byy Lessor of construction financing acceptable to LLessor at the
o ffices of the lender of Lessor's c h o i c e , and shall be completed
i i. I~ i ~
« ^
_ ~ - 4. U ~
4.1
. /»«.
T/»
4. U ~ ~ ~
« U «• 1 1
U ~
If
there
shall
be
a ~ delay in the
within 12 months t h e r e a f t e r .
repair
of
any
improvements
caused
by s t r i k e s ,
construction or
riots, acts of God, shortages of labor or m a t e r i a l s , national
emergency, g o v e r n m e n t a l r e s t r i c t i o n s , laws or regulations or any
other cause or causes beyond either party's c o n t r o l , such delay
shall not be a violation of this Lease and the time periods set
forth in this Lease for any such work shall at such
party's
option be extended for a period of time equal to the period of
delay.
Anything to the contrary herein contained
notwithstanding, the design and construction
of the store front for the
premises shall be at Lessor's sole cost and e x p e n s e .
In a d d i tion, it is agreed and understood that Lessor shall construct the
improvements called for in this L e.ase
~ - ~ with
«««•* the
+*- understanding
..^--••. *~^ < «~ that
Lessee sh_all sell a sufficient number of membershipsp"prior
to
*
•ompletio rT"fc f the Athlet ic Club to guarantee that the payments
equired By this contrac t will be paid; Lessee agrees to assign
—
...
- sufficient amount to guarantee said
payments
in a
dues income
according
to
individual
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
h
i
p
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
contract
dccoraing to inaiviaual raemoersnip c o n t r a c t s oy contract numoer

the

A

\

n^.

'

t o

-'

*

-

-

-

-

•

•

M

•

to a special account designated solely for the payment of monthly
lease payments due and payable under the terms of this L e a s e .
These contracts must be acceptable to Lessor and the mortgage
loan company.
V

Lease Term.
A.

The

term

of the Lease

shall

be as

follows:

Original Term--The
parties
hereby
agree
that
effective
with
the
date
of
execution
of
this
Agreement that the Lessee shall have the use of
the Premises for the sum of ONE DOLLAR AND NO/100
($1.00) per month with the additional u n d e r s t a n d ing that Lessee agrees to pay for his own u t i l i ties.
At such time as the improvements described
in paragraph two are s u b s t a n t i a l l y completed, the
permanent term of this Lease shall c o m m e n c e .
The
permanent terra shall be for a period of 15 years
commencing after Lessor and Lessee agree i m p r o v e ments to the building are s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o m p l e t e ,
and the p r e m i s e s can be occupied by Lessor and
open to the public for b u s i n e s s .
The Lease shall
end on the last day of the 15th y e a r .
The $1.00
per month herein refers to the office space in the
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Kress Building.
If Lessor leases this
Lessee will be required to relocate.
B.

building,

Option to R e n e w — I f the Lessee desires to continue
to occupy the premises for an additional period,
the Lessee shall have successive one year renewal
terms after giving notice to the Lessor, prior to
the expiration of the original term of each prior
renewal period.
Upon such action, the Lessee
shall have a renewal of said Lease for an additional one year period at a rate acceptable to
Lessor.

VI
Lease Payments.
Lease payments for the premises and
improvements described in this Agreement shall be equivalent to
the sum of the following three elements computed and payable on a
monthly basis:
A.

The portion of the monthly amortization of the
permanent financing attributed to interest over
the initial
15 year lease period
referred
to
herein; plus

B.

The portion of the monthly amortization of the
permanent financing attributed to the principal
sum required in construction of this job, including the prorated amount of land cost, computed as
the declining balance over the initial 15 year
lease period; plus

C.

The monthly charge of $0,085 ($1.00 per year) per
square foot of the leased premises based upon a
total square footage of approximately
64,640
square feet.
In addition to the above monthly
payments. Lessee shall pay to the Lessor a total
of
$64,000.00
per
year
payable
monthly
at
$5«333.33 to represent the amount of rent Lessor
is required to pay to the owner of the Harver
Warehouse
Building.
In
addition
to
this
$64,000.00, the Lessee will be required to pay an
increase added to this sum of $9,000.00 per year
making a total of $73,000.00 each year during the
second five-year period of this lease, payable
monthly, and during the third five-year period of
this
Lease,
this
amount
will
increase
to
$82,000.00 per year, payable in equal monthly
payments.
It is further agreed that the minimum
rent will be no less than $36,000.00 per month
during the first year and this amount will increase thereafter as herein described.

D.

Cost of Living Index Annual Computation—In addition to the above rent described in Items A and B
herein. Lessee will be required to increase the
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rent described in this Lease equal to any increase
in the cost of living i n d e x .
However, this increase will not exceed the sum of eight percent
(8%) per year even though the increase in the cost
of living index may exceed that amount.
E.

Security Deposit — The Lessee shall remit to Lessor
the sum of $20,000 within 10 days after commencement of c o n s t r u c t i o n ; the sum of $20,000 within 2
days after construction
is certified
to be 5 0 %
complete,
and
the sum of $30,000 on or before
Lessee shall occupy the improved space as s p e c i fied a b o v e .

F.

Acquisition of Sufficient F i n a n c i n g — T h i s Lease is
subject to Lessor being able to secure sufficient
financing to rebuild or remodel as the case may be
the premises to be occupied
under the terms of
this Lease at a rate not to exceed 12% (12 perc e n t ) per annum, and that Lessee shall pay all
annual
interest
charges
in
excess
of
12%
(12
p e r c e n t ) per annum, provided that if the Lessor
does decide to pay a higher interest rate than
twelve percent ( 1 2 % ) , the annual interest rate is
acceptable to the L e s s e e .

VII
Use of P r e m i s e s .
The premises shall be used and o c c u pied by the Lessee for the purpose of operating an athletic club,
including all uses associated t h e r e w i t h , including but not l i m i ted to physical e x e r c i s e , training and conditioning
facilities,
r e s t a u r a n t s , snack b a r s , club f a c i l i t i e s , and such other uses as
may be reasonably associated t h e r e w i t h .
Lessee shall occupy and
use the premises for this purpose only and no o t h e r .
Lessee
shall not make or permit any use of the premises which
shall
constitute
a nuisance
or which
shall
cause
offensive
odors,
sounds or a p p e a r a n c e s or which, directly or i n d i r e c t l y , is forbidden
by public
law, ordinance or g o v e r n m e n t a l
or municipal
regulation or o r d e r .
Lessee shall at its expense be entitled to
place d e c o r a t i o n s or other improvements inside the premises and
shall furnish and maintain the same in a good and
attractive
c o n d i t i o n , at Lessee's expense and r i s k .
It is understood and
agreed that this is a "triple net" Lease in which the Lessee
agrees to assume full r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the payment of all taxes
(particularly
including
but
not
limited
to
property
taxes),
insurance
and m a i n t e n a n c e
of the Harver
B u i l d i n g , or for any
other
improvements
located
in any other
building
occupied
by
Lessee.
Lessee shall occupy and use the p r e m i s e s in a lawful
manner complying with all laws and o r d i n a n c e s of the State of
Utah, the City of Salt L a k e , the county of Salt L a k e , and all
rules and r e g u l a t i o n s of the Board of Fire U n d e r w r i t e r s for Salt
Lake City, State of Utah.

come,

VIII Parking.
first served

The Lessor shall provide parking on a firstbasis to accommodate
the c u s t o m e r s of the
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Lessee with respect to the premises described in this Agreement.
Lessor agrees to provide access to the Harver Parking Terrace for
the members, customers and guests of the Downtown Athletic Club
on the same basis as other tenants of the Kress Building, Grant
Building, and other adjoining buildings to the premises described
in this Agreement.
IX
Utilities.
The Lessor shall until substantial completion of construction and remodeling of the premises pay all
utilities within and upon the premises and thereafter Lessee
shall be responsible for and shall promptly pay all charges for
use or consumption of separately metered heat, sewer, water, gas,
electricity or any other utility services from the date of commencement of the lease term, with the understanding that Lessor
shall make provisions to separately meter water, gas, electricity
and other utility services consumed by Lessee.
X
Indemnification.
The Lessee shall indemnify Lessor and
save it harmless from suits, actions, damages, liability and
expense in connection with loss of life, bodily or personal
injury or property damage arising from or out of the use or
occupancy of the premises or any part thereof, or occasioned
wholly or in part by any act or omission of Lessee, its agents,
contractors, employees, servants, invitees, licensees or concessionaires, whether occurring in or about the leased premises
but excluding the common areas and facilities or elsewhere within
the premises.
Lessee shall not be liable for damage or injury
proximately caused by the negligence of Lessor or its agents,
servants or employees.
This obligation to indemnify shall include reasonable attorneys fees and investigation costs and all
other reasonable costs, expenses and liabilities from the first
notice that any claim or demand is to be made or may be made.
Lessor shall not be responsible or liable to Lessee or to those
claiming by. through or under Lessee, except in the event of
negligence for any loss or damage to either the persons or property of Lessee that may be occasioned by or through the acts or
omissions of persons occupying adjacent, connecting or otherwise
adjoining premises.
Lessee "shall be responsible for any defect,
latent or otherwise, in any of the equipment, machinery, utilities, appliances or apparatus in the building and shall be responsible and liable for any injury, loss or damage to any person
or to any property of Lessee or other person caused by or resulting from bursting, breakage, or by or from leakage, or failure of
fire sprinklers.
Lessor shall not be responsible or liable for
any loss or damage to either the persons or property of Lessee
which may be caused by leakage of steam or snow or ice. running,
backing up. seepage or the overflow of water or sewerage in any
part of said premises, or for any injury or damage caused by or
resulting from acts of God or the elements, or for any injury or
damage caused by or resulting from any of said premises, the
building, machinery, apparatus or equipment by any person or by
or from the acts or negligence of any other occupant of the
premises.
Lessee shall give prompt notice to the Lessor in case
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of fire or a c c i d e n t s in the premises or in the building
defects therein or in any fixtures or e q u i p m e n t .

or of

XI

Hlil£L_£l—§—Ii>l£ii£Il • T h e L e s s o r and the L e s s e e
hereby waive any rights each may have against the other on a c count of any loss or damage occasioned to the Lessor or the
Lessee, as the case may b e , their respective p r o p e r t y , the p r e m 7
ises, or its c o n t e n t s , or to other portions of the p r e m i s e s ,
arising from any risk generally covered by fire and extended
coverage i n s u r a n c e ; and the p a r t i e s , each on behalf of their
respective i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n i e s , insuring the property of either
the Lessor or the L e s s e e , against any such l o s s , waive any right
of subrogation that it may have against the Lessor or the Lessee,
as the case m a y b e .
XII L e s s e e * s I n s u r a n c e .
The Lessee further covenants and
agrees that, from and after the earlier of the commencement date
of the term hereof or the commencement of any business by the
Lessee in the p r e m i s e s , it will carry and m a i n t a i n , at its sole
cost and e x p e n s e , the following types of insurance in the amounts
specified and in the form h e r e i n a f t e r provided f o r :
Bodily
injury liability i n s u r a n c e with limits of not less than ONE
MILLION DOLLARS AND NO/100 ( $ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) per person and TWO
MILLION DOLLARS AND NO/100 ( $ 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) per occurrence insuring against any and all liability of the insured with respect to
said premises or arising out of the m a i n t e n a n c e , use of occupancy
thereof, and property d a m a g e liability insurance with a limit of
not
less
than
TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND
DOLLARS
AND NO/100
($200,000.00) per accident or o c c u r r e n c e . All such bodily injury
liability insurance and property d a m a g e liability insurance shall
specifically insure the p e r f o r m a n c e by Lessee of the indemnity
agreement as to liability for injury to or death of persons and
injury or d a m a g e to property described h e r e i n .
XIII L e s s e e ' s I m p r o v e m e n t s .
The Lessee further covenants
and agrees that, from and after the earlier of the commencement
date of the term h e r e o f or the commencement of any business by
the Lessee in the p r e m i s e s , -it will carry and m a i n t a i n insurance
covering all of L e s s e e ' s leasehold i m p r o v e m e n t s , a l t e r a t i o n s ,
additions or i m p r o v e m e n t s , trade f i x t u r e s , m e r c h a n d i s e and personal property from time to time in, on or upon the p r e m i s e s , in
an amount not less than eighty percent ( 8 0 % ) of their full r e placement costs from time to time during the term of this A g r e e m e n t , providing p r o t e c t i o n against any peril included within the
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n "Fire and Extended C o v e r a g e , " together with i n s u r ance against s p r i n k l e r d a m a g e , vandalism and m a l i c i o u s m i s c h i e f .
Any policy p r o c e e d s shall be used for the repair or replacement
of the property damaged or destroyed unless this Agreement shall
cease and t e r m i n a t e under the p r o v i s i o n s described h e r e i n .
XIV L e s s o r 1 s I n s u r a n c e . The Lessor shall at all times from
and after the c o m m e n c e m e n t date of the term hereof maintain in
effect a policy or p o l i c i e s of i n s u r a n c e covering the building of
which the p r e m i s e s are a part, in an amount not less than ninety
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percent (90%) of full replacement costs for sprinkler damage,
vandalism and malicious mischief.
The Lessor's obligation to
carry the insurance provided for herein may be brought within the
coverage of any so called blanket policy or policies of insurance
carried and maintained by Lessor, provided that the coverage
afforded will not be reduced or diminished by reason of the use
of such blanket policy insurance.
Lessee agrees to pay Lessor
for such insurance within 30 days after billing.
XV
Increase in Insurance Premiums.
Lessee agrees that it
will not at any time during the terra of" this Agreement carry any
stock or goods or do anything in or about the premises which will
in any way tend to increase the insurance rates upon the building
of which the premises are a part.
The Lessor acknowledges and
agrees that there will be restaurants on the premises and such
use shall not be considered to be an increased insurance cost or
cause of cancellation of Lessor f s insurance.
The Lessee agrees
to pay to the Lessor forthwith upon demand the amount of any
increase in premiums for insurance against loss by fire that may
be charged during the term of this Agreement on the amount of
insurance to be carried by Lessor on the building of which the
premises are a part resulting from the foregoing or from Lessee
doing any act in or about said premises which does so increase
the insurance rates.
If due to the occupancy, abandonment, or
Lessee's failure to occupy the premises as herein provided, any
insurance shall be cancelled by the insurance carrier or if the
premiums for any such insurance shall be increased, then in any
of such events the Lessee shall indemnify and hold Lessor harmless and shall pay on demand the increased cost of such insurance .
XVI Destruction of Leased Premises.
If the premises are
partially damaged by any casualty insurable under the Lessor's
insurance policy. Lessor shall, upon receipt of the insurance
proceeds, repair the same, and the applicable monthly lease
payment of the premises shall be abated proportionately as to
that portion of the premises rendered untenantable.
If the
premises by reason of such occurrence are rendered wholly untenantable, or should be damaged as a result of a risk which is not
covered by the Lessor's insurance, or should be damaged in whole
or in part during the last three (3) years of the term or any
renewal term hereof, or the building (whether the premises are
damaged or not) should be damaged to the extent of fifty percent
(50J) or more of the then monetary value thereof, or damaged to
such an extent that the premises cannot be operated as an integral commercial unit, then or in any of such events. Lessor may
either elect to repair the damage or may cancel this Agreement by
notice of cancellation within one hundred eight (180) days after
such event and thereupon this Agreement shall expire, and Lessee
shall vacate and surrender the leased premises to Lessor.
Lessee's liability for rent upon the termination of this Agreement
shall cease as of the day following the event or damage.
In the
event Lessor elects to repair the damage insurable under Lessor's
policies, any abatement or rent shall end five (5) day** after
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notice by Lessor to Lessee that the leased premises have been
repaired.
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to abate
percentage lease payments, but the computation of such payments
shall be based upon the revised minimum lease payments as the
same may be abated.
Unless this Agreement is terminated by
Lessor, Lessee shall repair and refixture the interior of the
premises in a manner and to at least a condition equal to that
existing prior to its destruction or casualty and the proceeds of
all insurance carried by Lessee on its property and improvements
shall be held in trust by Lessee for the purpose of said repair
or replacement.
XVII Condemnation of Leased Premises.
If the whole of the
premises shall be acquired or taken by eminent domain for any
public or quasi-public use or purpose, then this Agreement and
the terms hereof shall cause and terminate in any such event. If
any part of the premises shall be taken as aforesaid, and such
partial taking shall render that portion not so taken unsuitable
for the business of Lessee then this Agreement and the terms
hereof shall cease and terminate as aforesaid.
If such partial
taking is not extensive enough to render the premises unsuitable
for the business of Lessee then this Agreement shall continue in
effect except that the minimum lease payment shall be reduced in
the same proportion that the floor area of the premises (including basement) taken bears to the original floor area demised and
Lessor shall, upon receipt of the award in condemnation, make all
necessary repairs or alterations to the building so as to reconstitute the portion of the building not taken as a complete
architectural unit, but such work shall not exceed the scope of
the work to be done by Lessor in originally constructing said
building, nor shall Lessor in any event be required to spend for
such work an amount in excess of the net amount received by
Lessor as damaged for the part of the demised premises so taken.
"Net amount received by Lessor" shall mean that part of the award
in condemnation proceedings which is free and clear to Lessor of
any collection by mortgagees for the value of the diminished fee.
If more than twenty (20) percent of the floor area of the premises shall be taken as aforesaid, Lessor may, by written notice to
Lessee, terminate this Agreement, such termination to be effective as aforesaid.
If this Agreement is terminated as provided
in this paragraph the lease payment shall be paid up to the day
that possession is so taken by public authority and Lessor shall
make an equitable refund of any lease payment paid by Lessee in
advance.
XVIII Award .
The Lessee shall not be entitled to and expressly waives all claim to any condemnation award for any taking, whether whole or partial, and whether for diminution in
value of the leasehold or of the fee, although Lessee shall have
the right, to the extent that the same shall not reduce Lessor's
award, to claim from the condemnor, but not from Lessor, such
compensation as may be recoverable by Lessee in its own right for
damage to Lessee's business and trade fixtures, if such claim can
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be made separate and apart from
prejudice to Lessor's award.

any award

to Lessor

and

without

XIX
Right to Re-Enter.
If the Lessee shall default in
payment of the lease payments reserved hereunder for a period of
twenty (20) days after any of the same shall have become due and
payable as aforesaid, or if Lessee shall abandon or appear to
abandon the premises or fail to conduct business therein for a
period of seven (7) consecutive business days, or if default
shall be made by Lessee in any of the other covenants and agreements herein contained to be kept and fulfilled on the part of
the Lessee (except with respect to the defaults specified herein)
for a period of twenty (20) days after written notice of such
default is given by the Lessor to the Lessee without action by
the Lessee to remedy such default and continuance of such action
to remedy such default to conclusion with reasonable diligence or
if the Lessee makes any transfer, assignment, conveyance, sale,
pledge or disposition, of all or a substantial portion of its
property or removes a substantial portion of its personal property from the premises other than by reason of an assignment or
subletting of the premises permitted under this Agreement, or if
the Lessee's interest herein shall be sold under execution then
and forthwith thereafter the Lessor shall have the right, at its
option and without prejudice to its premises, or the Lessor,
without such re-entry may recover possession of the premises, and
that after default be made in any of the covenants contained
herein, the acceptance of lease payments or failure to re-enter
by Lessor shall not be held to be a waiver of its right to terminate this Agreement, and the Lessor may re-enter and take r ssession thereof the same as if no rent had been accepted aftci such
default.
All of the remedies given to the Lessor in this paragraph or elsewhere in this lease in the event of default by
Lessee, are in addition to and not in derogation of all other
rights or remedies to which Lessor may be entitled under the laws
of the State of Utah, and all such remedies shall not be deemed a
waiver of any other or further rights or remedies.
XX
Maintenance.
Lessee shall be responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of all heating, ventilating, air
conditioning, plumbing and electrical systems on said premises
and all interior maintenance of the building; in addition. Lessee
shall be responsible for all plumbing, mechanical, electrical and
other maintenance related to swimming pools, and other special
use equipment installed by Lessee.
XXI Bankruptcy.
To the full extent permissible under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, specifically Section 365 thereof
(11 U.S.C. 365) or any successor thereto, if Lessee shall file a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy or take the benefit of any
insolvency act or be dissolved or adjudicated a bankrupt, or if a
receiver shall be appointed for its business or its assets and
the appointment of such receiver is not vacated within sixty (60)
days after such appointment, or if it shall make an assignment
for the benefit of its creditors then and forthwith thereafter
-10-

the Lessor shall have
event of non-payment.

all of the rights

provided

herein

in the

XXII Quiet Enjoyment.
Lessee, upon payment of the lease
payments and performing all of the terms on its part to be performed, shall peaceably and quietly enjoy the premises.
XXIII Force Majeure.
The parties shall be excused for the
period of any delay in the performance of any obligations hereunder, when prevented from so doing by cause or causes beyond
their control which shall include, without limitation, all labor
disputes, civil commotion, war, war-like operations, invasions,
rebellion, hostilities, military or usurped
power, sabotage,
governmental regulations or controls, fire or other casualty,
inability to obtain any material or services or through acts of
God.
Nothing contained in this paragraph or elsewhere in this
Agreement shall be deemed to excuse or permit any delay in the
payment of any sums of money required hereunder, or any delay in
the cure of any default which may be cured by the payment of
money.
No reliance by Lessee upon this paragraph shall limit or
restrict in any way Lessor's right to self-help as provided in
this Agreement.
No party shall be entitled to rely upon this
paragraph unless it shall advise the other party in writing of
the existence of any force majeure preventing the performance of
an obligation within fifteen (15) days after the commencement of
the force majeure.
XXIV Enforcement of Lease Expenses. If it becomes necessary
for either party hereto to enforce the covenants of this Lease,
the defaulting party will pay to the other party all costs and
attorney's fees that shall arise from enforcing this Agreement.
XXV Strict Performance.
It is mutually agreed that the
failure of the Lessor or the Lessee to insist upon strict performance of any of the covenants, restrictions or conditions of
this Agreement, or to exercise any option herein covered, in any
one or more instances, shall not be construed as a waiver or
relinquishment of any such covenants, agreements, conditions or
options, but the same shall be and remain in full force and
effect.
XXVI Binding Effect.
It is further mutually covenanted and
agreed that all covenants, agreements, conditions, stipulations,
recitals and options or elections herein contained to be kept and
performed by or given to and to be exercised by either party
shall bind and inure to the benefits of the legal representative,
successors and assigns of such party and to grantees of the
Lessor, excepting that no assignment by or through the Agreement
in violation of the provisions of this Agreement shall vest any
rights in the assignee.
* X V I 1 Notices. Notices and demands hereunder or pursuant to
any statute or ordinance now or hereafter enforced shall be
validly and sufficiently served, given or made if mailed in a
• 11-

sealed envelope, postage prepaid, and if intended for the Lessee,
addressed to the Lessee at 257 South Main Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, or if intended for the Lessor, addressed to the Lessor at
1760 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, until either party
shall designate by written notice a new address to which any such
notice or demand shall thereafter be so addressed and mailed.
All rights and remedies of the Lessor or
XXVIII Remedies.
Lessee herein enumerated shall be cumulative, and none shall
exclude any other right or remedy allowed by law.
XXIX General Provisions.
No receipt of money by the Lessor
Lessee after the termination of this Agreement or after the
of any notice or after the commencement of any suit, or

XXX Governing Law.
This Agreement shall be construed, and
the rights and obligations of the Lessor and Lessee shall be
determined according to the laws of the State of Utah.
XXXI Recordation.
The parties to this Agreement
the Lessee shall not record this Lease.
IN WITNESS
their hands and
19*^.

WHEREOF, the parties
seals on this the

hereto have
^n» day of

agree that

hereunto
W\h^

S. H. HORMAN & SONS.
A Partnership
•

By;

-<f/#//
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"PA7. Arr^rrL.
Duly Authorized O f f i c e r ,
f /,

LESS0R

set
•

and
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB,
A Utah Corporation

Inc.,

By:
Duly Authorized
LESSEE

STATE

OF

COUNTY

Officer,

UTAH
} 55
LAKE }

OF SALT

I hereby certify that on this
day of
,
1981, personally appeared before me
,
a duly authorized officer of .S. M. Horman and Sons, a partnership, and
a duly
authorized
f
officer of Downtown
Athletic
Club, Inc., a Utah
corporation,
known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the
within i n s t r u m e n t , and acknowledged that they executed the same
for the purposes therein c o n t a i n e d .
IN W I T N E S S

WHEREOF,

I have

hereunto

set ray hand

and

official

seal

Notary Public Residing
Salt Lake City, Utah
My

Commission

Expires:

in

and
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB. Inc.,
A Utah Corporation

By:Duly
'c^y-M.fr'VW
Authorize^ Officer,
LESSEE

STATE OF UTAH

}
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE }

I hereby certify that on this %f*
day of __ JfSfe^.
1981, personally appeared before me ^^V>^M v*->tau*»o"
a duly auUttrrl^zed officer of S. M. Horman and Sons, a partnership, and y ^cs (~t,.Yoom
, a duly authorized
officer of Downtown Athletic Club, Inc., a Utah
corporation,
known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the
within instrument, and acknowledged that they executed the same
for the purposes therein contained.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and official
seal.

r
Notify Publi* Resi ding in
Sal-t Lake cVty, Ut ah
My Commission Expires:
~

/ •

ILL"'v
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